Introduction
There is growing interest in peer effects in financial decisions, e.g. capital structure (Leary and Roberts, 2014) , institutional investment (Choi and Sias, 2009 ) and analysts' behavior (Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010) . A peer effect is said to exist if an individual agent's decision is affected by its peers' decisions. Several rationales behind peer effects can be found in the literature. First, an individual agent's decision and its peers' decisions may be strategic complements or strategic substitutes, depending on the situation (Bulow et al., 1985) . Second, due to agency motives, decision-makers may have incentives to mimic or separate themselves from peers (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990 ). Finally, according to the information cascades model, a herding behavior can arise with the belief that peers have made their decisions based on superior information (Bikhchandani et al., 1992) . Intuitive as they may seem, the existence of and reasons behind peer effects in corporate investment policy have been understudied. Due to endogeneity problems, it is a bit of a challenge to identify the causal effects of peer firms' investment decisions on a firm's investment decision 1 . In this paper, we try to improve our understanding of the existence, direction and determinants of peer effects in corporate investment policy.
We examine whether peer firms influence corporate investment policies, using accounting and stock market data of Chinese manufacturing firms over the period 1999-2013. Numerous theories, such as the basic neoclassical theory of investment (Jorgenson, 1963) , the Tobin-Hayashi Q theory of investment (Hayashi, 1982) , or the real option theory of investment under uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994 ) identify various determinants of corporate investment decisions. Given the risky nature of investment decision-making and the cost of acquiring relevant information, however, firms may tend to learn from and even mimic the decisions of other firms with similar attributes. Foucault and Fresard (2014) have shown that a firm's investment is influenced by peer firms' stock prices, but peer firms' stock prices could be affected by common factors that also affect the firm's investment. In order to address the endogeniety issue, we utilize peer-firm-average idiosyncratic return shock proposed by Leary and Roberts (2014) as an instrumental variable for peer-firm-average investment.
We further investigate whether economic policy uncertainty (EPU) magnifies peer effects in corporate investment behavior. In most cases, economic policies implemented by regulators alter business environments. Thus, uncertain economic policies bring about business uncertainty for firms. Intuitively, higher business uncertainty would worsen agency problems and make it more costly to make accurate investment decisions due to higher costs of information.
Therefore, peer effects are more likely to arise when economic policy uncertainty is higher. Baker et al. (2013) develop EPU indices for the world's major economies based on a textual analysis of economic policy news. We utilize the EPU index for the Chinese economy as China has had more frequent and significant economic policy changes over the last several decades 2 . A brief inspection of the index reveals that there are three spikes during our sample period, i.e., China's World Trade Organization (WTO) entry in 2001, declining exports and US$580 billion rescue package due to the global financial crisis in 2008, and the Euro debt crisis and trade protectionism, economic growth slowdown expectations, an anti-corruption campaign and political elections in 2011-2012. In addition, we explore more closely whether economic policy uncertainty affects the peer effects asymmetrically between overinvestment firms and under-investment firms.
Data and methodology
Our primary source of data comes from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) database, which contains financial statements and stock market information for Chinese listed companies. This study covers the sample period 1999-2013 for all listed manufacturing firms 3 . We carry out a series of data cleaning procedures, including the following ones. First, we drop observations without the key variables described below, including lagged investment. Second, we drop the information on B-share stocks as B-share stocks are restricted to foreign investors. Third, we drop ST (i.e., special treatment) firms as those firms suffered losses for two or more consecutive years and are not comparable with non-ST firms due to high default and delisting risks (Jiang et al., 2009 ). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Our final sample consists of 7,366 firm-year observations, corresponding to 994 firms. The total number of three-digit industries (i.e., peer groups) is 39 and we have on average some 29 firms per industry-year subsample.
To examine if peer firms affect corporate investment policy, we extend an empirical model used by Hubbard (1998) and Richardson (2006) by adding an ex post peer-firm-average investment measure to capture peer effects.
Our baseline model is specified as follows:
where INV i,t is defined as firm i's capital expenditures less sales of fixed assets at the end of year t scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t (Richardson, 2006; Bloom et al., 2007) . INV peer i,t is calculated as the average of the investment rates of all the firms in firm i's peer group, excluding itself. Peer groups are defined based on three-digit industry classification codes developed by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). We use a contemporaneous measure because the contemporaneous peer effect is much stronger than the lagged peer effect based on the correlation analysis. We expect that β 2 or the coefficient of INV peer i,t to be significantly positive.
CONT ROLS includes the natural logarithm of total assets (LNTA i,t−1 ), Tobin's Q (T Q i,t−1 ), leverage (LEV i,t−1 ), cash holdings to total assets (CASH i,t−1 ), the natural logarithm of the time elapsed since stock listing (LNAGE i,t−1 ), and earnings before interests and taxes to total assets (EBIT i,t−1 ). The control variables are similar to those in Richardson (2006) . To examine whether a firm reacts to peer firms' characteristics in addition to peer firms' investment decisions, we also include peer-firm-average characteristics such as LNTA peer i,t−1 and T Q peer i,t−1 in some regression models. In addition, we include year dummies to control for year fixed effects. Panel A of Table 1 presents summary statistics with respect to firm-specific and peer-firm-average variables.
[Insert Table 1 Here] However, the inclusion of a peer-firm-average investment measure (INV peer i,t ) on the right-hand side of Equation (1) is subject to some endogeneity problems in that (i) there should be confounding effects, as firms within the same peer group are exposed to the same or a similar investment environment; and (ii) there may be a reverse causality running from INV peer i,t to INV i,t . To address these endogeneity concerns, we adopt peer-firm-average idiosyncratic return shocks as an instrumental variable for peer-firm-average investment ratios INV peer i,t following Leary and Roberts (2014). The estimation model is shown below in Equation (2):
where i, j and t denote firm i, peer group j and month t, respectively. r i jt is firm i's monthly return. r mt refers to monthly market return and r f t refers to monthly risk free rate. r −i jt is the peer-firm-average monthly return for firm i (excluding firm i's own monthly return). Essentially, Equation (2) is a revised capital asset pricing model in which one additional component-excess peer group return (r −i jt − r f t )-is added to capture the common factors within the same peer group. This model is estimated on a rolling annual basis using monthly returns during the previous five-year period (with at least 24 observations). For each firm, we annualize actual monthly stock returns and expected monthly returns estimated from Equation (2) . The difference between the two is firm i's annualized Table 1 . On average, adjusted R 2 is as high as 53.8%. It is interesting to notice that a firm's monthly stock returns are weighted averages of market factors and industry factors, with one-third and two-thirds being weights, respectively, given that the constant is close to zero and the sum of the two factor loadings is almost one. Mean idiosyncratic return is around -10 basis points, which is comparable to that for US firms, as reported in Leary and Roberts (2014).
Results

Do peer firms influence corporate investment policy?
To investigate whether peer firms play an important role in determining a firm's investment policy, we first examine if peer-firm-average investment has a significant effect on a firm's investment. Panel A of Table 2 gives empirical results corresponding to the model specified in Equation (1) . The first three columns display results based on pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) (which ignores firm fixed effects), Within-Groups (henceforth referred to as FE) and System GMM estimators, respectively 4 . According to Nickell (1981) and Bond (2002) , a pooled OLS estimator is likely to produce β 1 that is biased upwards, while a Within-Groups (FE) estimator is likely to generate β 1 that is biased downwards when the length of time periods is not long enough. As a result, the estimated coefficients on other explanatory variables, such as peer-firm-average investment (INV peer i,t ), are also likely to be biased when using both an OLS estimator and an FE estimator. Our estimation results seems to be highly consistent with their variables for the equations in first-differences, and the first lag of their first-differences for the equations in levels.
The year dummies are used as IV-style instruments for the equations in levels only. The Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions does not reject this specification, and there is no significant evidence of second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The goodness-of-fit score of the reported System GMM model (0.323) is much higher than that of the FE model (0.118), and similar to that of the OLS model (0.337).
[Insert Table 2 Here]
The coefficient estimates of peer-firm-average investment, β 2 , are significantly positive across all three models, providing strong evidence for peer effects in corporate investment policy. Note also that the magnitude of β 2 based on System GMM is greater than those based on OLS or FE. Estimated coefficients for control variables suggest that firms with more investment opportunities, more cash holdings, a bigger size and higher profitability tend to invest more, while firms that exist longer and are more likely to be in the later period of their life cycle invest less. In
Column (4), we extend the model to examine the role of peer-firm-average characteristics as in Leary and Roberts (2014) and Foucault and Fresard (2014) . No significant empirical evidence is found regarding the role of peer-firmaverage characteristics in determining firms' investment policies. The additional instruments used in Column (4) are the second and third lags of peer-firm-average characteristics for the equations in first-differences, and the first lag of first-differences of peer-firm-average characteristics for the equations in levels. The Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions and Arellano-Bond second-order serial correlation test are comfortably satisfied. The goodness-of-fit score does not increase at all when we add peer-firm-average control variables.
However, as we have discussed earlier, endogeneity problems arise if a peer-firm-average investment measure is put on the right-hand side of the equation, with a firm's investment measure being the dependent variable. Thus, we use an instrumental variable, IDIO peer i,t described in Section 2, to address these problems. We consider the following two model specifications:
Reduced-form specification
by Arellano and Bover (1995) and developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) , is potentially more efficient than the difference GMM estimator. This estimator augments the system of equations in first-differences with additional equations in levels and uses the lagged first-difference of the dependent variable and explanatory variables as instruments for the equations in levels. We implement System GMM in Stata using the xtabond2 command proposed by Roodman (2009).
Structural-form specification
and Arellano-Bond tests are comfortably satisfied again. Consistent with the reduced form specification results, coefficients of INV peer i,t in both Column (3) and Column (4) are significantly positive and their magnitudes are comparable to coefficients for first-lagged investment rate, confirming that there are strong causal peer effects in corporate investment decisions. When we compare empirical results with and without peer firms' characteristics, the goodness-of-fit scores are very close. In addition, the coefficients of those peer firms' characteristics variables remain insignificant in Column (4), suggesting that firms react to their peer firms' actual investment policies rather than to the peer firms' characteristics. Overall, our results suggest that peer firms' actual investment decisions, a neglected factor in classical investment theories, play a very important role in determining a firm's investment policy.
Does economic policy uncertainty magnify peer effects in corporate investment policy?
To examine whether economic policy uncertainty is the main driver for the peer effects, we test whether more uncertain economic policy magnifies peer effects in corporate investment policy. The original EPU index has a large variation across time periods, ranging from 9 to 393, and its mean value is 112. As the EPU index is a monthly measure, we first take its annual average, and then divide the annualized EPU index by 100 and take the logarithm to get our proxy for economic policy uncertainty LNEPU t , as in Kang et al. (2014) . We consider the following specification:
where we allow the coefficient of IDIO peer i,t to be a linear or quadratic function of LNEPU t . We expect only the coefficient of LNEPU t × IDIO peer i,t to be significantly positive, but we consider a quadratic form just in case there is a nonlinear relationship between economic policy uncertainty and the magnitude of peer effects in corporate investment policy. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3 present corresponding empirical results based on the full sample.
In addition to the instruments used in Column (1) in Panel B of in Column (2) is not significant. These results show that the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and the magnitude of peer effects is closer to being linear than it is to being quadratic. The significantly positive coefficients of LNEPU t × IDIO peer i,t suggest that higher economic policy uncertainty amplifies the peer effects in corporate investment policy.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
To further explore the effect of economic policy uncertainty on investment inefficiency, we divide our sample into two parts, i.e., over-investment firms and under-investment firms 5 . To determine which firms over-invest or under-invest, we first cross-sectionally estimate Richardson's (2006) model for each industry-year group, with at least 20 observations to obtain optimal investment. We then define an over-investment (under-investment) firm as a firm whose actual investment is greater (less) than the optimal investment. Empirical results are shown in Column (3) to Column (6) . Interestingly, we find that the coefficient of the interaction term LNEPU t × IDIO 
Robustness tests
Our major findings are robust to: i) using the change in fixed assets divided by lagged total assets as an alternative investment measure, ii) using the Difference GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) , iii) using the Within-Groups estimator at the first stage regression to estimate the structural model as specified in Equation (4), and iv) using 4-digit CSRC industry classification codes to define peer groups.
Conclusions
We investigate whether there are peer effects in corporate investment policies, and find that a firm tends to invest more when peer firms invest more. Using peer-firms-average idiosyncratic return shock as an instrumental variable for ex post peer-firm-average investment, we confirm that positive causal peer effects in corporate investment policies exist. We further document that such peer effects are significantly stronger when economic policy uncertainty is higher. Analyzing over-investment and under-investment firms separately, we further find that economic policy uncertainty only exacerbates peer effects when firms invest less than their optimal investment levels. This result suggests that higher economic policy uncertainty could cause industry-wide under-investment problems to last longer, slowing down the recovery from a recession. Based on our empirical findings, we argue that economic policy should be planned and executed in a more consistent, reliable, predictable and transparent manner, especially during a recession. Note: Year dummies are included in all regression models. In Columns (1) and (2), we report standard errors that allow for intra-firm correlation. In Columns (3) and (4), we report two-step GMM coefficients and standard errors that are asymptotically robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, and which use the finite-sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005) . ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Note: Year dummies are included in all regression models. We report two-step GMM coefficients and standard errors that are asymptotically robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, and which use the finite-sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005) . ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Note: Year dummies are included in all regression models. We report two-step GMM coefficients and standard errors that are asymptotically robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation and which use the finite-sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005) . ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
